We illustrate how organizational ecology can contribute to strategic management and managerial practice by using resource-partitioning theory to make predictions with respect to: (1) the short run performance (i.e., growth and profitability) consequences of broad (generalist) vis-à-vis focus (specialist) strategies, (2) the detrimental performance implications of a particular instance of being strategically "stuck in the middle," and (3) the performance consequences of organizational size differences. We hypothesize that these effects depend on the position of the organization in resource space. These predictions are tested by estimating models of growth and profitability, using data on Dutch generalist (national) and specialist (regional) newspapers from 1968 to 1994. The findings show that resource-partitioning theory provides a dynamic backbone to understand the performance consequences of different generic strategies and organizational size positions.
INTRODUCTION
In explaining organizational performance, the theoretical perspective known as organizational ecology (Carroll & Hannan, 2000) has focused mainly on mortality; it has paid far less attention to short-run outcomes such as growth and profitability. As a result, many analysts fail to recognize the relevance of population ecology for management practice. 1 We would like to get such analysts to rethink this issue. We present our case by demonstrating that resource-partitioning theory (Carroll, 1985) , a theory fragment in organizational ecology, is informative with respect to understanding the performance consequences of different generic competitive strategies. The latter subject has been at the core of the strategic management field ever since Porter's (1980) seminal book. We claim that resource-partitioning theory offers a dynamic extension to the static Porterian framework; it yields additional predictions concerning the performance impact of strategic positioning in resource space.
In particular, this paper claims that resource-partitioning theory generates predictions about (1) the success of broad (generalist) vis-à-vis focus (specialist) strategies, (2) the fate of a particular way of being strategically "stuck in the middle," and (3) the performance consequences of organizational size differences.
We hypothesize how these effects depend on the position of the organization in resource space. These predictions are tested with estimating growth and profitability models for Dutch specialist (regional) and generalist (national) newspapers from 1968 to 1994.
extremely broad target areas, and the available free resource space is thin and highly marginal. So, as competition among generalists evolves toward a small-number equilibrium, the size and target breadth of the individual survivors increase but the combined resource space covered by all generalist organizations together declines (Carroll, 1985; Carroll & Hannan, 1995 & 2000 . This repositioning by generalists opens up resource space for specialists, increasing their viability. The end result of the unfolding of both components of the theory is a bifurcated or segregated population, with a few dominant generalists in the center of the market and specialist organizations that flourish in the periphery of the resource space.
The second component of the theory has received a great deal of attention in empirical research. Studies of many organizational populations over time have documented that as generalist concentration increases, the founding rates of specialist organizations often do rise and/or their mortality rates often do decline (see the extensive review in Carroll, Dobrev and Swaminathan, 2002) . The first component of the theory, by contrast, has not garnered much empirical attention. But, in studying the Dutch newspaper industry, Boone, Carroll and van Witteloostuijn (2002) recently found that the higher the homogeneity and concentration of relevant environmental resources, the higher the concentration of large generalist newspaper organizations competing on the basis of scale. So, the existence of a market center apparently triggers scale competition among generalists and facilitates generalist concentration, which in turn enhances specialist performance.
Strategic management theories and resource partitioning
In the field of strategic management, two major ideas about the primary sources of performance differences can be distinguished. The first originates in industrial organization and focuses on the impact of the environment on organizational performance (Caves & Porter, 1977; Porter, 1980) . This is the lens of the industry analysis tradition, directing attention to a firm's position in its competitive context. The second view stresses the importance of performance differences among firms with similar market positions. This lens focuses on internal resource-based differences between organizations as the driver of competitive advantage (Wernerfelt, 1984; Barney, 1986) .
No one has been more influential than Porter (1980) in strategic management. However, the impact of Porter's framework for industry analysis (the so-called "five forces" model) has been much greater than with his theory of generic strategies. Part of the problem is that the theory, like industrial organization's approach in general, is static, assuming environmental stability and market equilibrium (Boeker, 1991) . 3 By contrast, organizational ecology views competition in dynamic terms. For example, resourcepartitioning theory's main prediction is that competitive processes and outcomes (i.e., changes in market structure) within one strategic group (i.e., generalist organizations) affect performance within another strategic group (i.e., specialist organizations). So, it makes sense to us to use resource-partitioning theory to explore the dynamic underpinnings of Porter's theory of generic strategies.
RESOURCE-PARTITIONING PROCESSES AND COMPETITIVE STRATEGIES A fundamental competitive dilemma
Organizational ecology posits that the viability of different organizational forms is shaped by the characteristics of the resource environment. In the language of strategic management, the structure of the market determines, at least in part, the strategic options available to firms and the effect of these options on growth and profitability. What, then, are the organizational performance consequences of pursuing a generalist (i.e., broad) or specialist (i.e., focus) strategy in different environments? Or: "Under what industry circumstances can a firm select a specialist strategy … without being vulnerable to economies of scale or product differentiation achieved by broader-line firms?" (Porter, 1980: 146) .
Many prevailing theoretical accounts stress the suitability of specialization in markets in which buyers' tastes are fragmented (i.e., so-called fragmented markets). In such markets, which tend to be characterized by tough competition and small margins, it is generally acknowledged that in order to cope with fragmentation, it is beneficial for organizations to specialize by serving specific niches. The result is that every organization eventually specializes to serve niches that minimally overlap with other niches. However, many markets are not fragmented, but have a clear market center in which consumer tastes coalesce and resources are relatively more abundant. This is because industry fragmentation often only is a temporary state, as many industries tend to "consolidate naturally as they mature, particularly if the primary source of fragmentation was the newness of the industry" (Porter, 1980: 204) . In addition, organizations invest heavily in advertising and standardization in order to homogenize taste distributions, especially when scale advantages are present (Boone & van Witteloostuijn, 1995; Sutton, 1991) .
When there is a market center with scale economies, theory suggests that two fundamentally different routes might lead to above-average organizational performance: (1) position in the center of the resource space (generally with) large size or (2) position in the periphery (generally with small size). That is, a firm either opts for a scale-competition strategy of fighting for the center of the market (i.e., broad or generalist strategy) or prefers to avoid head-on competition by moving into the market's periphery (i.e., focus or specialist strategy).
Both options have specific advantages and disadvantages: generalists are able to reap economies of scale at the expense of tough scale-based competition in the market center to gain dominance, while specialists benefit from soft competition by differentiating away to the market's periphery but have to forego scale advantages. As a result, both generalist and specialist strategies might be associated with aboveaverage performance. Note that in a unimodal resource space the generalism-specialism distinction and size differences go hand in hand. This is because the generalist that obtains a toehold in the dense center may obtain an advantage over other competitors as the higher scale of activities leads to lower per-unit costs. Accordingly, competition among generalist organizations often triggers a scale-driven war for resources in the center where only dominant generalist organizations can prosper. For specialist organizations, size might hamper performance in so far that large specialists might clash with generalist organizations in resource space, triggering though competition with more cost-efficient generalist rivals. In this respect, Porter (1980: 208) also noted in a more general way that the cost of a focus strategy "may be some limitation in the growth prospects for the firm." To summarize, paradoxically enough, it follows from resource-partitioning theory that under certain conditions organizational scale/size and focus/specialist strategies simultaneously are major determinants of organizational performance. The tension between market center dominance versus market niche focus is a true dilemma, since the best of both worlds is hard to realize. This follows from the necessary but not sufficient condition for resource-partitioning processes to operate, namely that the resource space should be sufficiently heterogeneous . In other words, resourcepartitioning processes can only stimulate specialist performance when specialists have ample opportunity to differentiate themselves from generalists (i.e., when specialists and generalists are not direct competitors). In order to reap the benefits of specialization, a specialist organization has to locate itself far enough from generalists in resource space. If not, then generalists will be direct competitors with lower per-unit costs as a result of their size advantage, a competitive battle that is hard to win for specialist organizations.
What about other strategic positions? Imagine a multidimensional resource distribution with a single peak. Resource-partitioning theory predicts that specialists located somewhere between the peak and the periphery will be disadvantaged (Hannan, Carroll & Polos, 2002) . Specialist organizations located there tend to tap similar resources as the generalists, and therefore their growth and profitability prospects are likely to be poor. This unattractive position represents a particular way of being "stuck in the middle" between two desirable positions, to use Porter's oft-repeated phrase. 4 So, the success of a generalists or specialist strategy, and for that matter the impact of organizational size, depends on the position of the organization in resource space.
Proposition 1c: Under conditions of resource partitioning, specialists and large generalists will out-
perform organizations that are "stuck in the middle" of the resource distribution.
The dynamics of generalist concentration and specialist performance
The propositions above predict the average or mean performance consequences of generalist-specialist generic strategies in a specific resource environment. Although this approach makes useful predictions, it misses an important part of the competition process as it "fails to capture the dynamics of how relative competitive position can evolve and change among competing businesses" (Oliva, Day & Macmillan, 1988: 374) . In the present case, it obscures the possibility that specialists' performance evolves over time, in interaction with generalists' behavior. As a consequence of this stable view of industry structure, one may fail to see that specialist performance is caused, at least in part, by endogenous competitive processes among generalist organizations, and the resulting changes in industry structure, i.e., market concentration.
Under conditions of resource partitioning, a scale-driven escalation of competition among generalists for the center of the market is likely to occur. As the competitive struggle among generalists proceeds toward equilibrium, the size and target breadth of the individual survivors increase but the combined resources held by all generalist organizations together shrink. Now consider the amount of space likely available for discovery and population by specialists when overall concentration rises. Because concentration is determined from the consolidation of large generalists, this comparison can be made by measuring the total resource area outside generalist targets under different stages of the generalist competition scenario. As explained, this area comprises more space when concentration is higher (fewer and larger generalists), ceteris paribus. The theory holds that as this space expands, the viability of specialist organizations increases. That is, the concentration process among generalists creates the conditions for the emergence and spread of specialists, even when the underlying resource distribution remains unchanged. Accordingly, daily newspapers in the Netherlands can be meaningfully classified into two very different organizational forms. National newspapers, on the one hand, target the whole Dutch readership audience by publishing general national and international news. Regional newspapers, on the other hand, restrict their potential reading audiences to local residential populations by emphasizing the coverage of specific local news. So, national newspapers can be seen as generalists because they try to maximize their appeal to potential readership all over the Netherlands as their niches include every province or region (potentially providing strong scale advantages). Provincial or regional newspapers can be considered specialists in that they target smaller resource areas, i.e., the smaller provinces or regional communities. They differentiate from national papers by focusing on (local) news not provided by the nationals. The appeal of these specialists outside their target region is extremely low. So, a Dutch daily newspaper's geographical breadth -national in orientation or confined to a single province or region -is a good way to define its basic niche width. Boone, Carroll and van Witteloostuijn (2002) provide evidence that the Dutch newspaper industry is characterized by substantial scale economies. In addition, the regional resource distributions display peaks at roughly similar points. This implies that a market center can be discerned that allows for a common appeal to a large readership base. Boone, Carroll and van Witteloostuijn (2002) report that the difference in readership profiles (in terms of the socio-economic welfare of the readers) between national and regional newspapers within the Randstad is significantly smaller than outside the Randstad, which strongly suggests that national papers are more likely to compete head-on with the regional newspapers inside the Randstad. Outside the Randstad such competition is less direct, as regional newspapers emphasize unique local (i.e., non-Randstad and non-national) news. Because regional newspapers within the Randstad are located close to generalists in resource space, we expect them to be "stuck in the middle" by our usage of the term.
HYPOTHESES FOR THE DUTCH NEWSPAPER INDUSTRY
Scale-based competition for the Dutch market center governs interaction among the national newspapers. National dailies that win the size battle have substantial lower per-unit cost, which increases returns that can be invested again in the quality, scope and number of pages of the newspaper. These cycles cause a competitive rat race among national newspapers, where eventually larger nationals will out-compete their smaller counterparts. Regional newspapers can avoid this cut-throat competition, and therefore prosper, by focusing on local niches not served by national dailies. This focus strategy is sustainable because of the fragmented nature of the Dutch resource space, provided that the distance with national newspapers is large enough (i.e., niche overlap is small enough). The latter is probably not the case for regional newspapers inside the Randstad.
Almost all applications of resource partitioning to date rely on empirical tests using failure rates and founding rates as dependent variables. In the Netherlands in the period we study, however, there is almost no new entry by regional papers and newspaper failure is rare. So, we examine instead short-run performance outcome variables of newspaper growth and profitability, a switch that has the advantage of bringing the analysis more in line with typical studies in strategic management than organizational ecology.
In fashioning hypotheses, we derive straightforward translations of the theory for these outcome variables.
That is, we ignore for the moment possible important differences between, on the one hand, vital rates of founding and mortality and, on the other hand, growth and profitability. (We will return to this important issue in the Discussion section.)
Hypothesis 1a: Both large-size generalist (broad) and differentiation-oriented specialist (focus)
newspapers experience above-average growth and profitability.
Hypothesis 1b: Size affects national newspaper growth and profitability (positively), but not regional
newspaper growth and profitability.
Hypothesis 1c: Regional newspapers outside the Randstad and large national newspapers will outperform (in terms of growth and profitability) regional newspapers inside the Randstad, as the latter are "stuck in the middle."
Escalation of competition among national newspapers is likely to lead to an increase in market concentration.
The usual prediction of resource-partitioning theory is that concentration among national newspapers paradoxically enhances regional newspaper performance.
Hypothesis 2: Concentration among national newspapers increases the growth and profitability of regional newspapers.
The reason is that concentration among national newspapers opens up resource space for regional newspapers. Specifically, in the case of newspapers this means that readership bases of the regional dailies and the national newspapers should diverge with concentration. We can view this separation in terms of the socioeconomic characteristics of the readership bases or "reader profiles" for each type of paper.
Hypothesis 3: Concentration among national newspapers increases the socioeconomic distance of the reader profile of a regional newspaper and the average reader profile of national newspapers.

DATA AND METHODOLOGY
Observation plan
Our observation plan includes every independent daily newspaper that ever operated during the period 1968-1994 in the Netherlands. We classified a daily newspaper as independent if an independent editorial board produces it. Thus, a newspaper consisting of several chain newspapers but produced by the same editorial board is regarded as one organization. We also made a distinction between national and regional newspapers, the latter either operating inside or outside the Randstad. The number of regional and national newspapers operating in the Netherlands was 42 and 11 in 1968, and 32 and 8 in 1994 . Statistical analyses were conducted at the newspaper level, using data for every year from 1968 to 1994, when available.
Dependent variables
The dependent variables are circulation growth, financial profitability and reader profile distance. Circulation growth data are obtained from the yearly publications of the industry's statistical office CEBUCO (CEBUCO Dagbladen Oplagenspecificatie in various years). For each daily, we collected the number of newspapers sold in each of the provinces in the Netherlands in a given year. We aggregated this provincelevel circulation data to the newspaper level to obtain a measure of newspaper size. Unfortunately, for the years 1969 and 1971 circulation size was missing for most of the newspapers. So, estimates of circulation size in these two years were obtained by interpolation. As a result, when growth models are estimated, we have a complete data set of every newspaper that ever appeared in the Netherlands in the period (with n = 1131).
Profitability information is only available as of 1971. Since then, the Dutch newspaper association (Vereniging Nederlandse Dagbladpers, or NDP) executes a yearly survey collecting data on the cost and revenue structures of newspapers. On the basis of this information, we calculated a newspaper's profitability by dividing profit before tax by total revenue. This is the standard return-on-sales (ROS) measure, frequently used in strategy research. Unfortunately, as participation to the survey is voluntary, several newspapers often did not, or only partially, complete the questionnaires. This creates missing data, especially the more we go back in time, reducing our number of observations from 1131 to 696 when profitability rather than growth is the dependent variable.
Since 1965, CEBUCO organizes large-scale surveys on a more or less regular basis in order to map the socioeconomic readership profile of the newspapers. We used this information to measure the socioeconomic reader profile distance of a regional newspaper from the average profile from national newspapers. A daily's reader profile is measured in terms of the distribution of the newspaper's readers over four welfare categories in the year of observation (relatively poor, lower middle class, higher middle class and relatively wealthy).
For each welfare category, we calculated the absolute difference of the proportion of readers of a focal regional newspaper in a certain category with the average proportion of readers of the national newspapers in that category. Next we summed these four absolute differences to obtain an overall profile distance measure.
These surveys are not available every year, again resulting in missing data. The number of observations drops from 1131 to 370 when this profile distance measure is the dependent variable.
Independent and control variables
The original data are organized at the newspaper-year-province level of analysis. By definition, national newspapers sell newspapers in every province. The circulation of most regional newspapers, however, is confined to one or two provinces. Even when circulation of a regional is spread over several provinces, in most cases it is still clearly concentrated in one province. So, by and large, the provinces coincide with the niches in which the regionals operate. The fact that we have province-level information and know where each newspaper competes is important for two reasons. First, we can make a distinction between different types of specialists depending on their position in resource space. Specifically, regional newspapers that realize more than 50 percent of their circulation inside the Randstad provinces (i.e., North-Holland, SouthHolland and Utrecht) were classified as "inside Randstad" regionals, and the other regional papers as their "outside Randstad" counterparts. Second, we were able to measure the independent variables at the exact level where competitive processes unfold, increasing the precision of our measures. Specifically, when modeling regional newspaper performance, we measure the control and independent variables at the province level. For regional newspapers having circulation in more than one province, we weighted the control and independent variables at the province level with the focal newspaper's province circulation size before aggregating these variables at the newspaper level. When modeling national newspaper performance, the same control and independent variables are measured at the national level.
The major independent variables are organizational size, measured as circulation size, and concentration among the national newspapers. The latter is proxied by the C 4 -ratio, which is the sum of the circulation size of the four largest national newspapers divided by the total circulation of the nationals, calculated both regionally and nationally. In some models, we also checked for the impact of the readership profile distance of a focal newspaper vis-à-vis the national dailies (described above) on circulation growth and newspaper profitability. We expect that this distance measure is positively associated with the performance of regional newspapers. In the models where we use this measure as an independent variable, we deemed it appropriate to interpolate the proportion of readers in each welfare category of a newspaper before calculating the profile distance.
The control variables correct for the effect of covariates at the individual-newspaper and at the resourceenvironment level (province level for regional newspapers and the Netherlands as a whole for national newspapers). At the newspaper level, we include age (number of years since establishment) and the number of chain papers published by an independent newspaper. The latter controls for potential scope economies that may be realized by such a publishing strategy. In some models, we also included an additional profile distance variable to test for the impact of the positional distance of a paper within its own strategic group.
We calculated the distance of the reader profile of each newspaper with the average profile of the regional newspapers appearing in the same province. The calculation method is exactly the same as the one used for the profile distance vis-à-vis the national newspapers. At the resource-environment level, we controlled for the number of cities with more than 100,000 inhabitants. The presence of relatively large cities suggests the existence of local sustainable niches, which might enhance regional newspaper performance. The carrying capacity of the relevant niche was measured with the population in thousands. The economic condition of the province was controlled for by including the number of province-level unemployed inhabitants in thousands.
When times are hard, one might especially expect circulation of regional papers to fall as people cut back on expenses. These data come from a variety of sources. The data on unemployment were obtained from Regionale Gegevens over Arbeid (from the Dutch Central Bureau of Statistics: CBS). Unemployment information was not available for the years 1968, 1969 and 1970 . These gaps were closed by linear extrapolation. The Regionaal Statistisch Zakboek (CBS) was used to obtain the number of inhabitants and the number of cities with more than 100,000 inhabitants. Finally, we also correct for the effect of traditional organizational ecology covariates measuring the extent of competition at the appropriate level of analysis:
organizational mass of the regional and national newspapers (sum of the circulation of regionals and nationals, respectively), and density of regional and national newspapers. These variables were calculated based on the information provided by the CEBUCO publications. 
Models and estimation
Our observations are structured as a pooled cross-sections (newspapers) and time-series (1968-1994) data set. As a first step, we used analysis of variance to analyze the overall average performance differences between the different strategic groups (i.e., national newspapers, and regional newspapers inside and outside the Randstad). This exercise also allows us to assess the general explanatory power of strategy type (i.e., focus) and organizational size (see Hypotheses 1a and 1c). Next, the other hypotheses were tested by means of the growth and profitability models introduced below, estimated for the three types of newspapers we distinguish. We estimated growth models similar to those used by Barnett (1994) and Barron, West and Hannan (1994) . The proportional growth rate (Size t+1 /Size t ) is assumed to depend on (a) the size at time t and (b) an exponential function of independent variables impinging on that growth rate. To simplify estimation, such growth models are log-transformed, implying estimation of models of the following type (Carroll & Hannan, 2000) :
where i indicates the newspaper and x´i ,t is a vector of covariates. In this analysis, the size variable refers to the annual circulation of a daily newspaper. Thus, the models presented below estimate the proportionate growth of the circulation size of the newspapers in the period 1968-1994.
Note that the models imply an intrinsic growth rate, r i,t , that is determined by the values of the covariates measuring newspaper and environmental characteristics. The modeling approach has the attractive property that it enables us to see whether or not Gibrat's Law (Gibrat, 1937) holds, which says that proportionate growth is independent of current size. This can be seen by subtracting ln(Size i,t ) from both With respect to the profitability models, we regress newspaper profitability on the same covariates as used in the growth models. Every covariate included in the models was lagged one period.
Following Barron, West and Hannan (1994) , we run fixed-effect models to estimate the parameters of our covariates. We used the so-called within-estimator for the following reasons. First, it is an appropriate method to deal with the standard problem of autocorrelation generally resulting from the pooling of crosssections and time-series data (Barron, West & Hannan, 1994) . Second, it is a very conservative estimate as it controls for any type of unobserved heterogeneity across newspapers. The latter is very important for our purpose because of the missing data with respect to profitability and profile distance. Even when the occurrence of missing data is systematically related to newspaper characteristics (which is not unlikely), this would not affect the within-estimator as newspaper identity is controlled for. The models were estimated using the statistical package STATA (version 6.0).
FINDINGS
To analyze average performance differences between our different strategic groups, we performed analyses of variance, as presented in Table 2 . Panel A focuses on the overall differences between generalist and specialist newspapers. In Panel B, the regional newspapers are split into those operating inside versus their counterparts outside the Randstad. The dependent variables are (ROS) profitability and (circulation) growth.
In each analysis, we control for the year to which the observation pertains and we check whether the differences between the strategic groups depend on the year of observation. Circulation size is entered as a continuous covariate. Note that the average circulation size of the national newspapers is almost three times larger than the size of the regional specialists. Specifically, average circulation size equals 207,099 (sd = 175,556 and n = 241) for the nationals, 69,417 (sd = 59,066 and n = 364) for the regionals inside the Randstad, and 71,842 (sd = 38,158 and n = 585) for the regionals outside the Randstad.
(Insert Table 2 about here) Both Panels A and B in Table 2 reveal large significant differences between the different strategic groups in terms of profitability. The F-values of the strategic group factor and of circulation size are very large and highly significant. The Panel A and B models explain about one third of profitability differences, i.e., 30 and 34 percent, respectively. As expected, a focus strategy appears to be very profitable for regionals operating outside the Randstad. The national newspapers, on average, have the lowest profitability.
However, the (positive) impact of size on profitability is large. This implies that generalist newspapers have to be large to be profitable. Indeed, the average profitability of the largest four national newspapers equals .112 (sd = .059 and n = 64), which is even higher than the average profitability of the regionals outside the Randstad. So, there are clearly two opposite routes to profitability: the largest nationals and the regionals outside the Randstad substantially outperform the regionals inside the Randstad. This pattern supports Hypotheses 1a and 1c with respect to profitability. The findings also offer preliminary evidence as to the importance of size for the national newspapers (Hypothesis 1b).
For circulation growth, the impact of both newspaper circulation size and strategic group membership is smaller. In fact, in Panel A no significant differences can be discerned. Probably, the prediction of organizational growth rates is a more complex matter in a resource-partitioning context because the specialist form might face size constraints (Jaffee, 2001) . However, consistent with the profitability results, we find in Panel B that regional newspapers inside the Randstad are "stuck in the middle" with respect to growth rates, too. Interestingly, regional newspapers located far away from national dailies have similar growth prospects as their national counterparts. The average growth rate of the largest four nationals is, again, even higher than the average rate of the regionals outside the Randstad (average = .029, sd = .034 and n = 101).
Taken together, the findings clearly support the pattern predicted in Hypotheses 1a, 1b and 1c. In a resource-partitioning context, success depends on the newspaper's position in resource space: the successful newspaper either is squarely positioned in the center (large generalist) or it finds a viable niche in the resource periphery (specialist outside the Randstad). Specialist newspapers located too close to the generalists are stuck in the middle (specialists inside the Randstad).
In the analyses presented above, we focused on average, i.e., static, performance differences between different types of newspaper strategies in a segregated market setting. In the following models, we explicitly focus on the process of segregation itself by analyzing the marginal impact of changing levels of generalist concentration on (a) newspaper performance and (b) the distance in readership profiles between regional and national newspapers. These analyses aim at deepening our understanding of where the large average performance differences come from in the first place. Growth and profitability models for regional newspapers outside the Randstad, inside the Randstad and national newspapers are presented in Tables 3 and 4 , respectively. For each strategic group we estimate two models, with and without the profile distance measures. Note that the number of observations considerably drops when the profile distance variables are entered, as explained above. These analyses should therefore be regarded as exploratory and as a consistency check for the 'full' models. We, therefore, focus on the latter models first. Tables 3 and 4 about here) From Models 1 and 3 of Table 3 , it follows that Gibrat's Law does not hold for regional newspapers.
(Insert
That is, the coefficient of Ln(circulation) is substantially below unity. Our estimates of size [θ = .861 (Model 1) and .888 (Model 3)] are very similar to the estimates reported by Barron, West and Hannan (1994) in their growth models of New York City credit unions. They imply that, on average and conditional upon the values of the other covariates,
The size coefficient for the national newspapers (Model 5) is much larger than the estimates for the regional newspapers, and does not significantly depart from one, implying growth rates proportional to size in the national segment. These estimates should be interpreted with caution because the fixed-effect method systematically underestimates the impact of the lagged size variable (Barron, West & Hannan, 1994; Nickell, 1981) . Nevertheless, the comparison between the growth rate of regional and national newspapers is interesting for our purpose. At the same circulation size of 70,000 (approximately the average size of the regional newspapers), the growth rate of national newspapers is more than 3.5 times larger than that of the regional newspapers.
7 This is consistent with resource-partitioning theory, predicting substantial growth opportunities for newspapers targeting the market center. The growth rates of regional newspapers, however, are clearly constrained by size because of their focus on peripheral and thus smaller niches.
Before commenting on the impact of generalist concentration, we first return to Hypothesis 1b in more depth. We predicted that size would be a major determinant of national newspaper profitability but not of regional newspapers. We find that size, notwithstanding the presence of scale economies, does not enhance profitability of regional newspapers inside the Randstad (Model 9 in Table 4 ). The coefficient of ln(circulation) is even negative, though not significant. For national newspapers, size has a large and significant positive impact on profitability, as expected (Model 11 in Table 4 ). Contrary to expectations, size also has a positive impact on the profitability of regional newspapers located outside the Randstad (Model 7
in Table 4 ). However, these coefficients are much smaller that the ones observed for the nationals. Taken together, the quest for profitability among national newspapers is indeed dominated by size competition.
Regionals inside the Randstad do not benefit from being relatively large, on the contrary; regionals outside the Randstad do, however, although to a lesser extent than the nationals. A possible reason is that the latter regionals are positioned far away from the nationals in resource space, which probably allows them to grow relatively large, reaping scale economies, without inducing though competition with the nationals. So, Hypothesis 1b is clearly confirmed for national newspapers. However, for regional newspapers the impact of size (relative to newspapers in the same strategic group) depends on the position in resource space. The general assertion that specialization tends to preclude a (relative) growth strategy seems to hold for regionals inside the Randstad, but apparently not for their counterparts outside the Randstad. We return to this point below.
What about the performance impact of concentration among the generalists (Hypothesis 2)? We find that the standard resource-partitioning prediction-generalist concentration enhances specialist performancealso applies to growth and profitability. Concentration has a positive impact on both growth (Models 1 and 3
in Table 3 ) and profitability (Models 7 and 9 in Table 4 ). Three of the four coefficients are significant. The only non-significant estimate pertains to the growth rate of regionals inside the Randstad (Model 3 in Table   3 ). The latter is consistent with findings of Boone, Carroll and van Witteloostuijn (2002) , who report that concentration among national newspapers at the province-market level decreases the market share of the regional newspapers inside the Randstad as a group. Inside the Randstad, regional newspapers and national dailies are direct competitors so that escalation of competition, and the resulting concentration among the nationals, goes together with a shrinking niche for regional newspapers, suppressing their growth opportunities. Interestingly, the findings for specialist profitability are clear: generalist concentration has a large impact on the profitability of both types of regional newspapers.
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Why do specialists generally tend to perform better when generalists become more concentrated (Hypothesis 3)? Resource-partitioning theory argues that this is because the concentration process tends to increase the distance in resource space between generalists and specialists. In Table 5 , we report regression estimates of the readership profile distance measure on generalist concentration and the other covariates.
(Insert Table 5 about here) As predicted, the estimate of generalist concentration is positive and significant. So, the welfare profile of the reader base of a focal regional newspaper deviates more from the average reader profile of the nationals when concentration rises. To explore whether this increasing distance has an impact, in turn, on newspaper performance, we entered the readership profile distance measures in the equations of Tables 3 and 4 (Models 2, 4 and 6 for growth; and Models 8, 10 and 12 for profitability). The only significant estimate is the positive impact of the profile distance variable on the profitability of regional newspapers inside the Randstad.
Apparently, regional newspapers in the Randstad can increase their profitability when they differentiate away in terms of reader welfare profile from the nationals. Outside the Randstad, profile distance does not have a significant marginal impact on regional newspaper performance. It may be that differentiation in terms of the welfare profile of readers is not relevant outside the Randstad as there regional newspapers are already different enough, focusing on local news not covered by the national newspapers. Inside the Randstad, where the possibility to differentiate in terms of local news is limited, regional newspapers probably have no choice but to differentiate with respect to other resource dimensions, such as welfare. This might explain the significant marginal effect of profile distance on profitability inside the Randstad, a region where national and regional newspapers are direct competitors. Apparently, concentration among the nationals offers a way out for regional newspapers that are stuck in the middle precisely because it increases the readership profile distance between nationals and regionals.
Note that these inside-Randstad findings are consistent with the suggestion concerning the trade-off between growth and profitability made above. As regional newspapers inside the Randstad have to differentiate to be profitable, they probably have to forego growth and (relative) size as a consequence. If the above reasoning is correct, one should expect a non-linear relationship between size and profitability for newspapers operating inside the Randstad (nationals and regionals together). That is, small and large firms will be most profitable, compared to newspapers with average size. We therefore re-estimated Model 7 of Table 4 with Ln(circulation) squared added to the equation (for regional and national newspapers together).
We indeed find evidence for a U-shaped relationship [estimate of Ln(circulation) = -3.020, se = .586 and p = .000; estimate of Ln(circulation) squared = .135, se = .025 and p = .000].
DISCUSSION
Our general purpose here was to explore the extent to which organizational ecology increases our insight into a very fundamental question in the field of strategic management: Why do some organizations perform better than others? Specifically, we used the resource-partitioning framework to investigate the impact of different niche-width strategies on organizational performance. We hypothesized that organizations face a fundamental dilemma in heterogeneous markets characterized by a market center and scale economies. The dilemma occurs because there are two opposite routes to above-average organizational performance in such markets. The first is winning the scale-driven head-on competitive battle for the market center (broad or generalist strategy). The second is differentiating away from the center by focusing on specific, viable niches in the market periphery (focus or specialist strategy). Specialists that position themselves too close to center players in resource space are "stuck in the middle" in the sense that they suffer from scale disadvantages compared to their direct rivals without the benefit of soft competition. Thus, resource-partitioning theory predicts that the impact of specialist (or focus) strategies and organizational size (or scale) depends on the position of an organization in resource space. We also hypothesized that the escalation of competition among generalists, leading to concentration in the market center, eventually opens up resource space for specialists in the market periphery, increasing their performance.
We tested the hypotheses with data from the Dutch newspaper industry over the period 1968-1994. We analyzed average performance differences between three major strategic groups, i.e., national newspapers, and regional newspapers inside and outside the Randstad. We also estimated dynamic growth and profitability models for each of these newspaper types separately. We acknowledge that the relatively large number of missing values for our socioeconomic distance measures with respect to readership profile, and to a lesser extent for ROS profitability, is a limitation of the present study. However, the pattern of results appears to be strikingly consistent, giving us confidence in the following major findings. First, on average, the best-performing newspapers in terms of growth and profitability are the regionals outside the Randstad and the largest national newspapers. Second, regional newspapers located too close to national newspapers, i.e., inside the Randstad, are "stuck in the middle" and perform worst. Third, organizational size is the major determinant of profitability of national newspapers. Inside the Randstad, regional newspapers must trade-off size for profitability. Fourth, concentration enhances marginal performance of regional newspapers, both outside as inside the Randstad (in the latter case only for profitability). Fifth, this is probably due to an increase in the readership profile distance of regional newspapers vis-à-vis national dailies, at least for the regional papers inside the Randstad. Thus, concentration can be considered to open ways out for regional newspapers that are in a "stuck-in-the-middle" position.
In our view, these findings have implications for strategic management, organizational ecology and organizational growth theories. As far as strategic management is concerned, our results underscore the old assumption, central in the Porterian industry analysis approach of the 1980s, that the characteristics of an industry are important determinants of the generic strategic options available to organizations, and of the effect of these options on organizational performance. This suggests that it may be unwarranted to downplay the importance of the external environment too much in favor of stressing internal resource-based differences between organizations as drivers of performance (cf. Rumelt, 1991) , as is frequently the case in recent streams in strategic management. This study also adds new insights to the traditional static industry analysis approach (Porter, 1980) . Although specialist organizations are an important phenomenon and a source of diversity in the modern organizational world, the performance consequences of a focus strategy have received scant empirical research attention in this tradition. Our findings increase our knowledge about the conditions under which different generic strategies in general and focus strategies in particular are successful. It shows that, under conditions of resource partitioning, both focus and size can be major determinants of above-average organizational performance simultaneously. In addition, resource-partitioning theory reveals the dynamic interplay and subtle endogenous tension between different generic strategies, which in the Porterian tradition are generally regarded as unrelated strategic options. The dynamic analyses indicate that the success of focus strategies depends on the outcome of competitive processes within the generalist strategic group and, as a result, on market structure itself. Specifically, the fates of specialists are intricately related to size competition for the center of the market among organizations with a broad target (i.e., generalists).
Moreover, our propositions, hypotheses and findings increase our understanding of the profitability consequences of size differences, and of a conception of "stuck-in-the-middle" applicable to segregated populations. Porter (1980: 44) already noted that "there is no single relationship between profitability and market share," without being very clear as to what to expect under which circumstances. Resourcepartitioning theory allows one to make accurate predictions as to the impact of size under predefined conditions. In addition, it also yields a precise stuck-in-the-middle concept, showing that the position in resource space relative to generalists drives whether specialists are successful or not. Taken all this together, our study clearly shows that resource-partitioning theory has much to offer to the practice of strategic management. It provides a solid backbone to understand the strategic dynamics between different forms of organizations. As the proof of the pudding is in the eating: even very simple resource-partitioning models explain more than 30 percent of profitability differences between Dutch newspapers.
The findings also have implications for organizational ecology. First, resource partitioning appears to be a powerful theory fragment as it does not only explain vital rates of organizations but also, at least in part, their growth and profitability. This will very likely increase the impact of organizational ecology outside its 'inner circle' as its theories and findings will more easily spill over to strategic management and ultimately management practice. Second, although resource-partitioning theory predicts that concentration among generalists opens up resource space for specialists and therefore increases specialist performance, empirical
research has yet to examine the underlying positional behaviors of firms relative to each other during the partitioning process. Our analysis shows that concentration increases the distance between the audience or customer profile of specialist organizations and the average profile of generalists. Apparently, the distance in resource space between specialists and generalists increases due to concentration. Third, the findings inform us about the difference between resource-partitioning and size-localized competition (Carroll & Hannan, 2000: 276-277) . According to the latter theory, middle-sized firms are "stuck in the middle," facing strong competition from organizations both below and above the size of the focal firm. This implies that organizations in the middle of the size distribution have poor life chances (Hannan & Freeman, 1977; Carroll & Hannan, 2000) . Our findings suggest that size in itself is not enough to define a "stuck-in-the-middle"
position. This is because the impact of size seems to depend on the actual position of the organization in resource space. In our case, regional newspapers within the Randstad are clearly stuck in the middle, although their average size is not larger than that of their regional counterparts outside the Randstad. It is only inside the Randstad that middle-sized firms perform worse, compared to smaller and larger competitors.
Outside the Randstad, the middle-sized firms are not stuck in the middle. Fourth, traditional niche-width theory in organizational ecology emphasizes selection on the basis of the niche width of organizations. That is, some environments favor specialist organizations with a narrow niche profile, whereas other environments select generalist organizations with a broad niche strategy (Hannan & Freeman, 1977 & 1989 .
As our study shows, however, in segregated markets generalists and specialists are both viable, at least in terms of growth and profitability.
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It is critical to note, however, that our findings about the impact of generalist concentration on specialist growth contradict those of Jaffee (2001), in the only other empirical study of organizational growth in a resource-partitioning context. In his study of Silicon Valley law firms, Jaffee (2001) finds strong evidence that generalist concentration actually reduces the growth rate of the specialist law firms that ever operated in Silicon Valley from 1966 to 1997. Jaffee (2000 Jaffee ( & 2001 finds this pattern even though the effect of generalist concentration is beneficial to the vital rates of the specialist population: founding rates increase and failure rates decline as generalists consolidate. So, in Jaffee's studies, the different "performance" measures of vital rates and growth vary in their behaviors under resource partitioning. Jaffee argues that specialist law firms have to trade-off growth for a lower likelihood of failure resulting from specialization (Jaffee, 2001 ).
The general issue raised by the different findings of these studies concerns what happens to the resource space freed up by generalist consolidation-is it taken by existing specialist incumbents through growth or by newly entering specialists? Answers to these questions might hinge on research design decisions or on substantive and theoretical differences in context. First, consider research design. We use a highly limited definition of specialists compared to Jaffee. Specifically, we limited our focus to daily newspapers, ignoring many specialists such as magazines and weekly newspapers that target much thinner niches in the fringe of the market than our regional dailies. Presumably, Jaffee's delineation of law firms includes the equivalent types of specialist law firms. Also, for whatever underlying reason, our definition of specialists restricts us to a set of organizations that hardly experience new foundings under the period of observation. So, it is not surprising that any newly available resource space would be taken by incumbents; there are no new firms to compete against. But the lack of new firms might be because newspapers can grow so quickly to fill the space. Perhaps law firms are more constrained in their growth; or, alternatively, perhaps law firms are more easily started than newspapers and can thus readily appear in new resource space. So, it may be that growth constraints and entry barriers differ markedly across the two organizational forms studied.
It is also fair to say that the market conditions and therefore the competitive rules of the game significantly differ in the newspaper versus the law-firm industry. Specifically, the newspaper market shows strong economies of scale over the full range of the organizational size variable, including regional dailies (see Boone, Carroll and van Witteloostuijn, 2002) , which may not be the case for the law firms studied by Jaffee (2001) . It is therefore not surprising to find that the average level of generalist concentration is three times larger in the newspaper case compared to the law study (average four-firm concentration ratio equals .75 versus .25, respectively). Also consistent with the presence of scale economies is that the number of newspapers gradually declined over the period under study (especially regional newspapers). These differences have two major implications. The comparatively low level of concentration among generalist law firms suggests that market segregation is not yet fully achieved, reducing the free space available in the market periphery. In addition, because of the presence of scale economies in the newspaper market periphery, the free space resulting from generalist concentration has probably been filled in by the growth of incumbent specialists, erecting entry barriers for new specialist foundings. We assert that in the law market, however, due to the absence of strong economies of scale, generalist concentration has triggered the entry of new, small specialist organizations. This new entry in turn might have restricted the growth of incumbent specialist law firms. To summarize, it is likely that in some cases new entry precludes growth of specialist incumbents (e.g., specialist law firms) whereas in other cases scale economies and growth of incumbents hamper entry of new specialists (e.g., newspaper market). The above discussion reveals an important general issue deserving more attention in future research. It makes clear that the shape of the resource space (i.e., the level of fragmentation and the distribution of niche sizes), the prevailing market conditions (e.g., the extent of scale economies) and the behavior of different organizational forms jointly determine the nature of growth of these forms and the specific organizational outcomes one can expect. It also suggests that a distinction should be made between performance at the level of the form (e.g., growth of density or mass of the specialist form) and the performance of individual member organizations of that form (e.g., organizational growth).
Concerning organizational growth theory, the findings also shed light on why so many inconsistent results with respect to tests of Gibrat's Law in several settings have been reported (Carroll & Hannan, 2000) .
Our study suggests that it depends on the characteristics of the population or industry whether one can expect proportionate growth to be independent of size. In homogenous industries, in which organizations compete for the same resources, assuming Gibrat's Law is not unreasonable. However, our estimates show that under conditions of resource partitioning, the impact of organizational size on growth rates depends on the organization's position in resource space (and, in fact, on its position in the size distribution itself). Growth rates follow Gibrat's Law in the segment of national (relatively large) newspapers, whereas size suppressed growth rates among regional (relatively small) newspapers. So, in such relatively heterogeneous industries where focus opportunities exist, it is probably misleading to search for industry-level evidence for Gibrat's Law. As a result, future growth theory could benefit from a contingency perspective that maps the conditions under which different types of size dependencies with respect to growth rates can be expected.
Finally, we conclude with three general comments and suggestions for further research. First, the reasoning in this paper is confined to populations under the so-called 'conditions of resource partitioning'
constraint. This implies that sufficient resource heterogeneity, a scale advantage, and a market center (i.e., unimodal taste distribution) must be in place . These conditions, of course, limit the generalizability of the framework. However, we believe that the constraints we define here are not very restrictive. Many industries do have scale economies, witnessed by strong globalization tendencies in many populations. In addition, companies massively invest in homogenizing taste distributions by, for example, advertising and standardization (Boone & van Witteloostuijn, 1995; Sutton, 1991) . Nevertheless, the question can be posed as to what happens when resource distributions have other shapes. In this respect, we suspect that the problem of "stuck in the middle" is far less salient when organizations operate in a rectangular (or fragmented) resource environment (Hotelling, 1928; Péli & Nooteboom, 1999) . In such distributions, which tend, for instance, to fit young industries in which tastes
have not yet crystallized around a certain average taste, the so-called "biological compression hypothesis" probably applies. This hypothesis says that competition usually acts to reduce the array of habitats or patches used by a species (MacArthur & Wilson, 1967) . The result is that in flat distributions every organization eventually specializes to serve niches with minimal overlap with other niches. In such a tightly packed resource space, there is not much room to be "stuck in the middle." We believe that such extensions to the theory, mapping the interrelationships between different resource environments, market structures and strategic outcomes, will proof to be a very fruitful avenue for future research Hannan, Carroll & Polos, 2002) .
Second, the segregation process in a resource-partitioning market may not lead to a stable equilibrium state in which generalists and specialists peacefully co-exist forever. The reason is that second-order effects might bring two relatively distinct organizational forms closer together again, renewing direct competition.
For instance, if regional newspapers can benefit from reaping scale economies by positioning themselves in the local market center, while generalists can benefit from reducing within-group competition by differentiating away from other dominant generalists, they are likely to meet again in resource space, resulting in increased competition between both forms. So, generalists and specialists are likely to move to and from each other in resource space over time. It would be interesting to study the consequences of this pendulum-type of competition on generalist and specialist behavior, and on the implications thereof for the size distribution of organizations. For instance, questions such as, "At what size do specialists provoke retaliation of generalists?" and "When is it beneficial for a generalist to differentiate away from other dominant firms?" remain unanswered, and deserve attention.
Third, we started the paper by arguing that many analysts fail to recognize the relevance of the macrolevel population ecology findings for the micro-level functioning of organizations, and therefore ultimately also for management practice. In this paper, we used resource-partitioning theory to predict and explain the effects of different competitive strategies on very salient managerial organizational outcomes, such as growth and profitability. By doing so, we hopefully succeeded in illustrating the huge potential of organizational ecology reasoning for understanding organizational performance and informing management practice. We believe that more efforts in this direction are needed. Particularly, theory and empirical research linking the dynamics of different organizational outcomes such as founding, mortality, profitability and growth hold much potential. This will not only advance our knowledge in the field of strategic management and practice, but ultimately also in organizational ecology itself. .98* 179 # Independent variables are lagged one period, standard errors in parenthesis, and * = p < .05 (one-sided). † Indicated variables are measured at the national instead of the regional level in Models 5 and 6. .50* 128 # Independent variables are lagged one period, standard errors in parenthesis, and * = p < .05 (one-sided). † Indicated variables are measured at the national instead of the regional level in Models 11 and 12. .38* 147 # Independent variables are lagged one period. Standard errors in parenthesis, and * = p < .05 (one-sided). their models (controlling for size differences). Second, variables measuring the capacity and characteristics of the niche (such as population size and number of relatively large cities) and the extent of diffuse competition (such as mass and density) seem to 'work better' in the models pertaining to the regionals outside the Randstad. These variables basically assess the extent of diffuse competition for environmental resources. It is possible that inside the Randstad competition is governed more by direct competition, characterized by conscious strategic moves and countermoves to conquer the market center. As a result, the explanatory power of such variables might be smaller there. Outside the Randstad, however, where specialists come to occupy the uninhabited niches in the periphery of resource space as a result of generalist competition for the market center, niche characteristics and diffuse competitive conditions are probably more salient. Third, comparing the growth with the profitability models, we observe that the effect of several covariates depends on the criterion variable under study. For instance, a striking result is that the mass of the nationals has a positive effect on the profitability of regional newspapers outside the Randstad (suggesting symbiosis), but a negative impact on their growth (suggesting competition). This suggests that regional newspapers outside the Randstad are somehow able to avoid, at least with respect to profitability, the negative impact of the heightened competitive pressure resulting from an increase in the mass of the nationals. Although these differences are not always easy to explain, they do show that growth and profitability, though related, cannot be considered to be two sides of the same coin. It could therefore be fruitful in future work to focus in more depth on explaining and understanding the similarities and differences of the dynamics of growth and profitability (and other outcomes such as organizational mortality, for that matter). 9 It should be noted that there is a difference in the way niche width is defined in our study compared to the original theory. The original niche-width theory of Hannan and Freeman (1977) assumes that organizations face a single resource condition at any point in time. Intertemporally, environmental resources and conditions are assumed to be disjointed or highly dissimilar (Péli, 1997) . So, in this theory organizations face highly dissimilar environmental resource states that alternate over time. Because of the dissimilarity in environmental conditions, a generalist organization straddling two different resource pockets or conditions pays a price in terms of overhead or excess capacity. As discussed here, resource-partitioning theory uses a different assumption about environmental resources. In this theory, organizations confront several resource conditions at the same point in time, and these conditions are not assumed to be dissimilar over time.
